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Last year saw extensive protests in Russia, and efforts by President Vladimir Putin’s
government to isolate its opposition. Sean Roberts writes that while these efforts have
been moderately successful, they may undermine the pro-Putin consensus, and require
reworking in the future. Putin now has little room to make further mistakes if his government
wants to avoid a resurgent protest movement.
If  the f irst f ew weeks of  2013 are anything to go by then we should expect to see a
continuation of  the protests that came to def ine Russian polit ics in 2012. On January 13,
around 25,000 protestors (turnout remains highly contested) took to the streets of  Moscow to express
their dismay at the so-called Dima Yakovlev law banning US cit izens f rom adopting Russian orphans. At
the same time, the newly-f ormed opposition Coordination Council announced plans f or f urther mass
actions in coming months, as the protest movement looks to step up the pressure f or polit ical ref orm.
But has this reawakening of  independent polit ical activity had any posit ive impact on polit ical processes
over the past 12 months?
While there is no denying the scale and f requency of  the protests that f ollowed United Russia’s
f raudulent election victory on December 4, 2011, the short- term results remain modest, with litt le
evidence of  broadening public support. Posit ive achievements, such as the f ormation of  the opposition
Coordination Council in October 2012 are balanced by internal ideological divisions which preclude all but
a negative and narrowly f ocused anti-Putin agenda. Moreover, the ef f ectiveness of  the protest
movement has almost certainly suf f ered at the hands of  the authorit ies, who sensing a general
dissipation of  the protest atmosphere in the second half  of  2012, launched its own counter-of f ensive.
Since May 2012, the incoming Putin administration has taken a
number of  measures as part of  a larger strategy to ‘isolate’ the
protest movement f rom wider polit ical processes. Part of  this
strategy has involved caref ully calibrated polit ical ref orms
designed to boost United Russia’s electoral prospects while
presenting a progressive image of  change. The ref orm of  the
party system and the reconstitution of  direct governor elections
are cases in point, seemingly liberal on the outside, but with
enough contingency and small print to t ilt  the electoral playing
f ield in f avour of  the authorit ies. It is of  lit t le surprise that the
regional elections in October saw a strong perf ormance by
United Russia, while the f ive gubernatorial elections resulted in
convincing victories by pro-Kremlin candidates.
Alongside these pseudo ref orms, the authorit ies have also
passed a number of  laws that redef ine state-society relations
and address some of  the vulnerabilit ies of  the regime. In the
summer of  2012, legislators passed a controversial law requiring
f oreign-f unded NGOs engaged in ‘polit ical activit ies’ to
voluntarily register with the Ministry of  Justice as ‘f oreign agents’
or ‘f oreign spies’ depending on how the phrase is understood in
Russian The independent election watchdog, Golos, which did
so much to report f raud in the December 2011 State Duma
election presented itself  as an obvious motivation f or this law. Legislators also beef ed up existing laws
regulating demonstrations, re-classif ied libel as a criminal of f ence and adopted a web blacklist bill. The
loosely def ined treason law signed by Putin in November 2012 was seen as the most serious among the
growing list of  restrictive laws.
The authorit ies have also got personal in their ef f orts to tackle the protest movement. As of  January
2013, Alexei Navalny, the high-prof ile anti-corruption blogger and leader of  the opposition Coordination
Council is under investigation on three separate criminal charges. Interestingly, each charge relates to
alleged corruption committed by Navalny, as the authorit ies attempt to re-take the moral high-ground and
neutralise one of  the f ew issues capable broadening the protest movement’s popular support.
Meanwhile, f ellow Coordination Council leader, Sergei Udaltsov, is f acing serious public disorder charges
that, like Navalny, could result in a lengthy prison sentence. The overall strategy of  isolating opponents
has also involved a sustained ef f ort by state-controlled media to ref rame the protests as an American-
backed ‘contagion’ and part of  a wider plot to destabilise Russia. Thus, the protest movement is now
caught in the cross-hairs of  anti-American sentiment and a larger public f ear of  external threats, as the
regime taps into old prejudices and stereotypes.
While the Putin administration may f eel satisf ied with its ef f orts in dealing with the protest movement,
there have been enough unintended consequences to question the overall wisdom of  this
uncompromising approach. First, many of  the restrictive laws passed in 2012 are poorly def ined,
borderline unconstitutional or just plain unworkable. There have already been reports that the Russian
Justice Ministry is powerless to enf orce the NGO ‘f oreign agent’ law and it is not inconceivable that at
least some of  this hastily prepared legislation will require amending in the f uture. A second unintended
consequence is the growing schism among the pro-regime elite that threatens to undermine the Putin
consensus apparent during the past decade. Russia’s so-called ‘loyal’ opposition parties, such as the
Communists and A Just Russia are struggling to keep a lid on internal dissent as party activists demand
less acquiesce and more protest f rom party leaders. More signif icantly, the Putin administration’s tough
line has altered the regime’s delicate balance, marginalising the sizeable liberal- leaning elite who view
Russia’s prosperity and security t ied to polit ical modernisation.
Although the protest movement has made litt le immediate impact on polit ical processes thus f ar, it is
unclear what the longer-term ef f ects will be. Of  particular importance is how the regime’s response to the
f irst real polit ical crisis of  the post-Yeltsin period will serve to cut of f  f uture developmental paths. What
is clear is that there is now a growing belief  among the opposition that the Putin system is unref ormable
and that no amount of  dialogue with the authorit ies will result in posit ive change. As f or the regime, the
f ailure to ‘evolve’ the polit ical system and to make genuine ref orm has simply pushed the problem f urther
down the road. In the current pressured polit ical conditions, the regime has litt le room f or error, as the
next dubious election result, economic downturn or simple miscalculation by the Putin administration –
such as the unf ortunate adoption law – will likely bring people back to the streets in greater numbers
than bef ore.
This is article is based on the Finnish Institute of International Affairs briefing paper, Russia’s Pressure
Politics.
Please read our comments policy before commenting.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and
Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
Shortened URL for this post: http://bit .ly/14PbXuO
 _________________________________
About the author 
Sean Roberts – Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Sean Roberts is a Researcher in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood and Russia research
programme at the Finnish Institute of  International Af f airs.
Related posts:
1. The Russian opposition’s move towards a more concrete lef t-wing platf orm may
be a game changer in the struggle f or Russia’s f uture (18.3)
2. Five minutes with Sir Tony Brenton: “In twenty years’ t ime Russia won’t be perf ect, but it will be a
great deal closer to what Europe can regard as good neighbour than it is now” (14.2)
3. Book Review: The Strongman: Vladimir Putin and the Struggle f or Russia by Angus Roxburgh (20)
